allegedly gave a lecture at Princeton in which he asserted that the laws of physics should be simple. When asked by someone in the audience, "But what if they are not simple?" he replied, "Then I would not be interested in them. ''6 The quest for the simple and elegant solution pervades the history of science. In his classic work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 7 Thomas Kuhn describes the role of aesthetic considerations in replacing an old scientific paradigm with a new one: [T] here is also another sort of consideration that can lead scientists to reject an old paradigm in favor of a new. These are the arguments, rarely made entirely explicit, that appeal to the individual's sense of the appropriate or the aesthetic -the new theory is said to be "neater," "more suitable," or "simpler'' than the old. 8 Of course, paradigm shifts are not invariably based on aesthetic factors. A new paradigm may solve problems insoluble under the old paradigm, or it may predict phenomena totally unsuspected under the old paradigm -in short, the new paradigm may simply work better than the old. But where proof is impossible or premature, Kuhn considers aesthetic considerations decisive. 9 Aesthetic considerations encourage supporters of the new paradigm, even in the absence of empirical proof, to attempt to convince the rest of the scientific community to choose a new guiding principle. The tenacity of these early supporters is sometimes based only on personal and inarticulable aesthetic considerations. Indeed, Kuhn points out that "[m]en have been converted by [aesthetic considerations] ... when most of the articulable technical arguments pointed the other way .... Even today Einstein's general theory attracts men principally on aesthetic grounds, an appeal that few people outside of mathematics have been able to feel."Io
The aesthetic appeal of simplicity extends beyond science. Its force is particularly evident among reformers, including those who would promote a new social, political, or economic order. Eighteenth- Other philosophers of science take the view that scientific progress is evolutionary, not revolutionary, in nature. Gerald Holton, for example, maintains that scientific innovations do not require the "complete and sudden reorientation" implied by the revolution model but are instead part of an evolutionary process. Einstein apparently saw himself as part of an evolutionary chain, working on modifications of earlier theories. See G. HOLTON, supra note 2, at 26-27, 101..03; see also D. HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF THE SOCIAL AND CoNCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE 432-76 (1988) (demonstrating that science is an evolutionary process).
[Vol. 89:352 define with precision and I have not presumed to do so. 18 I have developed, however, some parameters for understanding the issues and language of aesthetics. In Part I, I develop a philosophical framework for considering the influence of aesthetic considerations on procedural reform. Next, in Part II, I examine how legal scholars have written about or made reference to aesthetics. Using categories and definitions gleaned from these two sources, in Part III I then identify and discuss aesthetic elements in the writings of a number of procedural reformers. Particularly noticeable is the attraction of several generations of reformers to procedural simplicity -an attraction that I suggest is partly aesthetic.
In Part IV, I conclude that a consciousness of the role of aesthetics in procedural formulation and choice is important. An aesthetic perception of procedure may spur valuable innovation: as in Kuhn's model of scientific revolution, proponents of a new order must sometimes cling tenaciously to their beliefs only on the strength of unarticulated aesthetic considerations. On the other hand, a view of procedure "for its own sake" may blind proponents to the social and institutional effects of a procedure or procedural system. In particular, the predominance of a single aesthetic vision can distort the way that procedure operates in fact. To assume, for example, that simpler procedures are always better is to overlook the disorderly and complicated world in which procedures must operate. This world contrasts sharply with the ordered simplicity of the natural universe. Thus, while Einstein could justifiably insist that the laws of physics be simple to mirror the natural perfection of the universe, simplicity alone may not justify a legal procedure. A procedure must function in the chaotic world of human transactions. Judged against this instrumental, nonaesthetic criterion, simpler procedures may not always be better.
The process of formulating and choosing procedures may never be free of aesthetic considerations, nor should it be. The human tradition of striving toward a world which inspires and pleases us is a venerable one. Nevertheless, bringing an awareness of aesthetic components to the surface may help to ensure that the role of aesthetics is controlled and positive. Such an awareness may also encourage the development of alternative aesthetic visions, less dependent on simplicity and more reflective of the complexity of human interactions, 1 9 on which to build future reforms. 18 . Even philosophers who specialize in aesthetics have diverse views about the nature of aesthetic experience. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 279.
I. AEsTHETICS AS PHILOSOPHY
Aesthetics is a distinct branch of philosophy concerned with the contemplation of aesthetic objects and resulting concepts and issues.
This branch studies "a rather heterogeneous collection of problems: those that arise when we make a serious effort to say something true and warranted about a work of art. " 20 One philosopher terms aesthetics "the philosophy of criticism, or metacriticism" because "[a]s a field of knowledge, aesthetics consists of those principles that are required for clarifying and confirming critical statements." 21 Not surprisingly, philosophers have utilized numerous approaches to the many issues that aesthetics encompasses. 22 One need not consider the entire range of aesthetics issues to extract a framework for analyzing aesthetic elements in procedural formulation and choice. I have isolated two questions for examination: "What does it mean to view something aesthetically?" and "What sorts of observations are aesthetic?"
A. The Aesthetic Attitude
Many philosophers believe that an aesthetic way of looking at things differs from other ways of experiencing these things. Some describe this aesthetic attitude as detached or disinterested: to view something aesthetically, one must focus only on the aesthetic object and its properties without reference to external factors such as the person who created the object or the culture of which the object is a part. 23 This intense concentration produces "the kind of admiring
M. BEARDSLEY, AEsnmTICS: PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRITICISM 3 (1958).
21. Id. at 3-4. The philosophy of art is a subset of aesthetics, concerned with issues that arise in connection with works of art and excluding the aesthetic experience pf other types of objects. Art criticism is distinguishable from aesthetics because it is concerned with critical analysis and evaluation of works of art. while aesthetics seeks to elucidate the concepts involved in such critical judgments. Hospers, Problems of Aesthetics, in 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 35,
(P. Edwards ed. 1967).
22. There are, for example, those who maintain that in order to appreciate a work of art one must view it on its own, without any reference to surrounding circumstances. See, e.g., C. BELL, ART 25-30 (1913) . In contrast, contextualists, as the name implies, believe that appreciation of works of art is enhanced by knowledge of context, including history, the artist's intention, the artist's biography, and other works by the same artist. See Hospers, supra note 21, at 44-45.
Another dichotomy exists between the formalist theory of art. which considers only formal properties of visual art relevant to aesthetic experience, and the expression theory, which maintains that a work of art must be expressive and that representation, emotion, and ideas can be legitimate aspects of aesthetic experience. See, e.g., R. FRY, VISION AND DESIGN (rev. ed. 1923) (formalist theory); c. DUCASSE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART (1929) (expressionist theory). Referring to the disarray in the field, one writer comments: "Indeed, aesthetics has long been contemptuously regarded as a stepsister within the philosophical family. ·Her rejection is easy to explain, and partially excused, by the lack of tidiness in her personal habits and by her unwillingness to make herself generally useful around the house." M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 11.
23. See Hospers, supra note 21, at 37.
[Vol. 89:352 contemplation, without any necessary commitment to practical action, that is characteristic of aesthetic experience. " 24 The aesthetic attitude is different from the practical attitude, which is concerned only with an object's utility. In contrast, the aesthetic attitude requires looking at something for its own sake: it is "the artistic attitude of pure vision abstracted from necessity ." 25 Aesthetician Monroe Beardsley observes: .
For example, you might say that there are at least two ways of regarding an apple. You might take a "practical" interest in it: you might want to judge its economic value, or worminess, or estimate the success of an apple harvest, and so on; that would be taking the apple as a clue for the manipulation of the physical environment. Or you might be interested only in savoring its "surface qualities," its color, texture, and taste. If you approach it in the latter way, it is for you, at that time, and in that respect, an aesthetic object. An analogous distinction can be made with respect to, say, Darwin's Origin of Species. If you are interested in learning facts about natural and artificial selection, or the history of biological theory, you are taking a practical attitude. But, if you wish, you can read it as an enormously patient and sustained argument, or as a masterpiece of style, or· as the record of a dedicated and selfless pursuit of an important truth about the world. In that case, you are after its "aesthetic qualities," and considering it not qua biological treatise, but qua literary work. 2 6
The aesthetic attitude also differs from both the cognitive attitude, which views an object with the aim of analyzing it and thereby increasing knowledge, and the personal attitude, through which a viewer considers an object only in relation to himself. Like the practical way of looking at things, both the cognitive and personal attitudes may be highly desirable and may produce important insights; they simply are not aesthetic. For example, a student may look at a building and identify its architectural style and time and place of construction. This cognitive approach is quite different from enjoying the experience of simply viewing the building "for its own sake." 27 Similarly, the man who goes to see a performance of Othello and thinks only of the similarity of Othello's situation to his own real life situation, rather than concentrating on the play itself, is not viewing the play aesthetically. 28 Despite the seemingly exclusive focus of aesthetics on works of art, philosophers generally contend that aesthetic experience is not limited to works of art. Even Beardsley, 'who restricts his definition of "aes- thetic object" to works of art, 29 admits that "quite often ae8thetic experiences of some degree of magnitude are obtained in the regular course of life from other things than aesthetic objects." 3° Furthermore, aesthetic attention is not necessarily limited to perceptual objects in the physical sense, that is, to objects that can be seen or heard. 31 One can also appreciate abstract entities aesthetically; literature, which consists of meanings rather than sounds or marks on paper, is an example of an aesthetic object that is not strictly perceptual. In this regard, one writer comments:
When we enjoy or appreciate the elegance of a mathematical proof, it would surely seem that our enjoyment is aesthetic, although the object of that enjoyment is not perceptual at all: it is the complex relation among abstract ideas or propositions, not the marks on paper or the blackboard, that we are apprehending aesthetically. It would seem that the appreciation of neatness, elegance, or economy of means is aesthetic whether it occurs in a perceptual object (such as a sonata) or in an abstract entity (such as a logical proof), and if this is so, the range of the aesthetic cannot be limited to the perceptual. 3 2
B. Aesthetic Value
In attempting to identify when critical statements refer to aesthetic value, I rely heavily on the work of Monroe Beardsley, whose theory of aesthetic value helps in classifying responses as aesthetic. While recognizing that other schools of aesthetic thought might approach 29. M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 63-65. 30. Id. at 530. Beardsley prefers an objective definition of "aesthetic object" based, first, on dividing perceptual objects according to their sensory fields ("some are seen, some heard"). Then, within these fields, he makes further distinctions -musical composition, for example, is distinguished from bird song and only the former is an aesthetic object. Id. at 63-64. Aesthetic objects produce aesthetic experiences of "the highest magnitude" and do so "most dependably."
Id. at 530. Nevertheless, Beardsley allows that "sometimes people will use perceptual objects that are not aesthetic objects by our definition as if they were aesthetic objects, and sometimes these objects serve moderately well in this unexpected capacity. 34 Beardsley devises his criteria for judging aesthetic value by examining the nature of critical judgment and identifying the various types of reasons given in support of critical evaluations. Those reasons referring to the features of the aesthetic object itself are called objective reasons and fall into three main groups: (1) those that bear upon the unity or disunity of the work; (2) those that bear upon the degree of complexity or simplicity of the work; and (3) those that bear upon the intensity or lack of intensity of the work. These categories are examined below.
Unity
Beardsley identifies two components of unity: completeness and coherence. Completeness is a simple quality, not analyzable into simpler qualities. To say that an object has completeness "is to say that it 33 . Theories of aesthetic value may be subjectivist or objectivist. Subjectivist theory main· tains that aesthetic value derives from the reactions of aesthetic consumers; in contrast, objectivist theory holds that aesthetic value inheres in properties of the aesthetic object itself. One type of subjectivist theory posits that statements of aesthetic value ("Xis aesthetically good/bad") are actually only claims of taste ("I like it I I don't like it"). This approach is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it confuses autobiographical judgments with statements of aesthetic value. A person may "like" a painting, for example, without thinking it aesthetically "good," or vice versa. Second, the subjectivist view makes disagreement on aesthetic matters impossible. Claims of taste are likely to be true; people are unlikely to lie about their likes and dislikes. Thus, if the person who says "Xis good" merely means "I like X." and the person who says "X is not good" merely means "I don't like X." there is no basis for disagreement. Subjectivism thus renders criticism arbitrary and absurd. See Dewey, The Meaning of Value, 22 J. PHIL. 126, 131 (1925) ; see also Hospers, supra note 21, at 53-54.
Similar problems arise when "Xis good" is taken to mean that the majority of people, or the majority of critics, or the majority of the "best" critics like X. Under this theory, the statement "X is good" still tells us more about those who are judging X than it does about X itself. See Hospers, supra note 21, at 54. Louis Schwartz appears to rely in part on a consensus approach to aesthetic value. See infra note 92; text accompanying notes 77-78.
Relativism, which attempts to avoid pitfalls of both subjectivism and objectivism, is another approach to aesthetic value. For an argument in support of relativism, see B. HEYL, NEW BEARINGS IN EsrHETics AND ART CRITICISM 125-55 (1943) . For a critique of the relativistic method, see M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 478-89.
34. As this section illustrates, Beardsley's approach to aesthetic value is one among many, I
have chosen to present it here in detail, and to utilize it later as a tool for analysis, because it allows statements of aesthetic value to be analyzed and opened up for discussion, thus avoiding the subjectivist dilemma. See supra note 33.
appears to require, or call upon, nothing outside itself; it has all that it needs; it is all there." 35 Coherence refers to how the parts of an object fit together. Beardsley isolates these principles of coherence3 6 as focus, balance, and harmony.
By focus, Beardsley refers to the dominant pattern or compositional scheme of an object. In the visual arts, the focus "may be that part of the painting that has the greatest perceptual strikingness or to which the eye is led ... by the convergence of strong lines." 37 Beardsley's second principle of coherence, balance or equilibrium, connects the parts of a whole, and ensures that a design does not disintegrate into separate parts. Thus, the problem of connecting two figures in a painting is really a problem of creating a balanced and therefore coherent work. Harmony, Beardsley's third touchstone, refers to similarities among the parts of a design. Beardsl~y notes:
As a rough generalization, we may say that, other things being equal, the more similarities there are among the parts of the design, the more coherent the design will tend to be. Similarity of texture, or, in other words, consistency of style, throughout the design, is one of the most powerful perceptual conditions of coherence. 38
Complexity
Complexity is correlative to unity. 39 By complexity, Beardsley means the number of parts, and the number of differences between these parts, within an aesthetic object. Beardsley uses the following example to explain his definition:
Unity and complexity are set over against each other: very broadly speaking, the former is increased by similarities of parts, the latter by differences. Thus if we take, say, a design of a given sort, with several distinguishable areas, we can always change it in two directions. If [Vol. 89:352 cut down on the variety of color-tones, we will, other things being equal, increase its unity but decrease its complexity; if we make every area of a different color-tone, we will increase its complexity, but decrease its unity.4-0
Intensity
Beardsley's final objective reason supporting critical evaluation is intensity, the requirement that "a good aesthetic object must have some marked quality, and not be a sheer nonentity or a zero. The quality does not matter -it can be sad or cheerful, graceful or rugged, soft or stem, provided it be something. " 41 To praise a painting because it exudes a sense of calm and stillness is to praise it for the intensity of a certain pervasive quality. 42 Beardsley argues that the concepts of unity, complexity and intensity are broad enough to be deemed General Canons under which all objective reasons can be organized. He concludes that all objective reasons used in making aesthetic judgments appeal directly or indirectly to these General Canons. Beardsley's justification of this conclusion is instructive. 43 He examines cases of critical reasoning and demonstrates how each uses the General Canons. Since critics do not necessarily use the terms "unity," "complexity," and "intensity," Beardsley in effect translates and abstracts these general themes from the passages that he examines. For example, a critic who refers to a poem as "very tightly organized" and another as "more confused" appeals to the Canon of Unity. 44 Similarly, a critical reference to the "richness and depth" of a work due to its "imaginative grasp of diverse materials" appeals to the Canon of Complexity, as does a reference to "economy" when it means variety of significance in line and shape. 45 Generally, references to "dramatic force," "dramatic power," and to "energy" invoke the The Canon of Unity is most relevant to the present analysis. It subsumes the notion of simplicity that is so prevalent in the writings of procedural reformers. Simplicity relates to both the completeness and coherence aspects of unity. A simple object is complete because it contains nothing superfluous, is all of one piece, and has everything it needs. A simple object is also coherent. Its parts integrate into a harmonious whole and its disparate elements meld into a single, clear, unconfused entity.
An understanding of these basic philosophical approaches helps to clarify the relationship between aesthetics and law. Law may, like a mathematical proof, be perceived aesthetically and provide aesthetic enjoyment. Critical assessments of a law or a legal system, particularly observations relating to simplicity or complexity, may convey judgments of aesthetic value. These insights serve as reference points for considering the writings of legal scholars discussed in the next section.
II. AEsTHETICS IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
A number of scholars have recognized the relevance of aesthetics to law. Some have used aesthetics explicitly either as a formal mode of analysis 47 or as a descriptive category. 48 Others have employed arts metaphors, implicitly invoking aesthetic norms as a way of understanding law. 49 No single approach to aesthetics prevails, nor does the word "aesthetic" itself have a discernible fixed meaning. Philosophical notions of aesthetics are present in legal scholarship, if at all, only as remote and shadowy reference points. Nevertheless, a number of writers suggest useful frameworks for applying aesthetics to law.
In this Part, I examine the use of aesthetics by four legal scholars: Robin West, Mark Kelman, Drucilla Cornell, and Louis Schwartz. After discussing their writings, I then attempt to distill common threads of meaning for use in analyzing the works of procedural reformers. Criticism. sz In this classic work of literary criticism, Frye developed four "aesthetic myths" recurrent in narratives.s 3 West first describes and then applies these myths to Anglo-American jurisprudence, using an aesthetic vocabulary inspired by Frye. Legal theorists are cast as narrators who combine either a "comic" or "tragic" vision of the world with either a "romantic" or "ironic" theoretical method. Using this approach, West is able to characterize the "aesthetic posture" of the critical legal studies movement as "dark, ironic comedy, tinged with awareness of the demonic"s 4 and the "aesthetic stance" of the political reactionary as "[r]omantic method coupled with a comic contentment with the present world."ss By contrasting aesthetic analysis with both "pure philosophical analysis" and "political rhetoric,"S 6 she draws powerful conclusions, and calls for an understanding of legal theories as art:
To the extent that legal theory is narrative ... it is also art. Therefore we must decide not whether the worlds we envision are true or false, right or wrong. Rather, we must decide whether they are attractive or repulsive, beautiful or ugly. Our acceptance or rejection of these aesthetic visions will in turn influence the historical choices we must make. The aesthetic quality of our art, like the quality of our play, deeply affects our lives: our imaginings are not only a part of our present, but a way of determining the limits of our future. s1
Mark Kelman uses aesthetics in a less formally defined, more pervasive manner. For example, in replying to a critique of his article on the Coase Theorem,ss Kelman contrasts aesthetic and empirical approaches to the theorem. He implies that his critics have not understood the aesthetic components of his approach and have instead SO insisted on an empirically based analysis: "Even if I could convince [my critics] that their 'data' is useless, I sense I would not succeed in making a case that is ultimately intended to be as .'aesthetic' as it is 'empirical.' " 59 According to Kelman, the theorem is "a world-creating expression," not "a world-describing hypothesis." 60 He labels this ·view hermeneutic/aesthetic: "[T]he Coase Theorem is not primarily an external statement about a culture or a statement that describes it. Rather, it is an internal statement expressing a culture. It is both description and ideology; a mixture of 'is' and 'ought.' " 61 The hermeneutic/aesthetic view rejects the positivist notion that empirical data can potentially falsify or verify the theorem. Instead, this view asserts that the Coase Theorem is a story about "a world in which everything must have its price.'' 62 Kelman continues, using aesthetics in a manner nearly identical to that of Robin West:
As with any story, one's reaction to this one must be in large part aesthetic; what human potentials are unfolded and revealed, which ones are suppressed? Is it a pretty world the story-tellers picture? To a considerable extent, a revealing study of economics must be a study of economists and the aesthetic pleasure we derive from their construction of a world. 63 Elsewhere in his work, Kelman uses the notion of aesthetics in varying contexts with somewhat different shades of meaning. In explaining his dislike of formalist legal scholarship, Kelman focuses on its "inelegance." 64 He characterizes his negative reaction to certain policy analysis scholarship as "simply aesthetic: what seems reassuringly familiar to some, a comfortable, well-grounded resting place for discussion, strikes me as numbingly boring and predictable. Not everyone likes E.T. " 65 When discussing the rules-standards debate in A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, 66 Kelman posits that "the rule form may always tend to appeal to the substantive individualist because its formal virtues match up aesthetically with the virtues he is inclined to admire.'' 67 Rules appeal to "the aesthetics of precision, to the psychology of denial or skeptical pragmatism," while standards appeal to "the aesthetics of romantic absolutism, to the psychology of painful 59 involvement in each situation, to the pragmatism that rejects the need for highfalutin generalities." 68 In an article identifying conscious and unconscious constructs pervasive in substantive criminal law, 69 Kelman concludes that his role in writing the article "would be largely aesthetic" if the constructs he was discussing did not have political meaning, if they were only "nonrational filters" enabling human beings to perceive and communicate. 70 He would exercise his aesthetic criticisms -to expose the emptiness of rhetoric proclaiming that legal results in cases are rational -"on behalf of those who no longer like to listen to people making arguments that mask a hidden structure of 'nonarguments' with insistent, false rigor."71 Drucilla Cornell describes as aesthetic the commitment necessary to reconstruct ethical group life and shape a better future. 72 She contrasts the aesthetic aspect of this commitment with "instrumentally rational reasons": commitment to a reconstruction of our social world is aesthetic because it must be made "without the promise or security of a rational guarantee." 73 Instead, an aesthetic commitment is based on a vision of what we may become. Cornell concludes that "[t]he moment of commitment is aesthetic in its orientation. It demands not only the capacity for judgment but also the ability to dream of what-isnot-yet. The ethical cannot be reduced to an aesthetic, but neither can it do without an aesthetic. "74 Lollis Schwartz gives aesthetics yet another shade of meaning in his essay Justice, Expediency and Beauty. 75 He proposes "that an important criterion of justice is aesthetic: a just decision or statute will be beautiful in that it fits, is proportionate to, or is 'just right' for its setting and era." 76 Schwartz contrasts the aesthetic criterion with the goal of expediency, which he rejects as a necessary condition for justice, noting that an expedient law or decision -one that promotes the greatest good for the greatest number -may nevertheless be unjust. 7 7 Rather than expedient, justice should be "beautiful" in the sense that 68. Id. at 61. beauty represents "an abiding aspiration for a quality that transcends utility or expediency. It is a quality that evokes in the appropriate audience a recognition of rightness, of fittingness according to a complex of psychological, historical, and political background shared by that audience." 78 To rescue aesthetic justice from the criticism that it is hopelessly subjective, Schwartz emphasizes the importance of the aesthetic responses of citizen observers 79 and admonishes the mass media to take more seriously its role in shaping citizen attitudes. 80 No single aesthetics approach emerges from a study of these writings. The term "aesthetic" is not always used with precision; some writers define their use of aesthetic analysis, while others seem to assume that readers have a shared understanding of what aesthetic means. Even the same writer may use "aesthetic" to mean one thing in one context and something different in another context. Nonetheless, several categories of meaning can be distilled from these writings.
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive
Formal mode of analysis. Aesthetics, as a philosophical discipline, has its own literature and language. 81 An art critic may apply aesthetic principles to a work of art Just as a mathematician may apply a theorem to a given problem or a law professor traditional legal analysis to the study of a legal opinion. Used in this way, aesthetics has a formal reality, an academic reference point, even though the validity or appropriateness of this reference point is open to challenge. 82 Taste. One characterization of aesthetic response takes the form "I like it" or "I don't like it." This kind of response might include an inability or a reluctance to discuss the matter further: "I don't know why -I just like it" or "I don't want to argue about it -I simply don't like it." Such a subjective notion of aesthetics poses a central dilemma for Louis Schwartz, who realizes that his vision of justice as beautiful prompts the question "beautiful to whom?" He concedes that "[w]ithin the single culture of our time and country, the aesthetics of some are satisfied only by the orderliness and harmony of Bach; others must have the romantic passion of Beethoven, Tschaikovsky, or A judgment of aesthetic value may go beyond a claim of taste. Robin West's challenge to evaluate legal theories in terms of "whether they are attractive or repulsive, beautiful or ugly" 86 and Mark Kelman's aesthetic approach to the Coase Theorem 87 refer to notions of the "attractive," "beautiful," or "pretty" and their opposites that seem to transcend individual preference. When Kelman explains his aversion to formalistic scholarship because it is "inelegant," he may be expressing his personal taste but he also may be referring to a more universal quality of "elegance" and its opposite. 88 Even though Louis Schwartz accepts the existence of competing aesthetic judgments, his theory of justice rests on a concept of "beauty" that eludes definition, but that "expresses an abiding aspiration for a quality that transcends utility or expediency." 89 Unlike claims of taste, these transcendent aesthetic values have a universal quality; critics can agree that the concept of beauty or elegance exists and has certain parameters and this agreement allows them to evaluate works more objectively.
Psychologically determined preference. Some scholars link aesthetics and psychological makeup. For example, Mark Kelman describes his vision of the aesthetic element in the rules-standards debate as the "aesthetics of precision" to which rules appeal, which is linked to "the 83. Schwartz, supr~ note 48, at 145. 84. Kelman, supra note 48, at 434. 85. One part of Drucilla Cornell's reference to the aesthetic suggests a claim of taste. She cautions that "[t]he ethical cannot be reduced to an aesthetic" which might be read as "the ethical cannot be reduced to merely a matter of individual taste." See Cornell, supra note 48, at 380. However, the context of her appeal to an aesthetically based commitment to the reconstruction of ethical group life more strongly suggests other meanings. See infra text accompanying notes 97-100. So too one may read Mark Kelman's theory of the aesthetic dimension of the rules-standards debate as an account based on taste (e.g., "certain kinds of people simply like rules better''). However, his account relies more clearly on psychology than on nondebatable claims of taste. To the extent that psychology determines taste, this may be a distinction without a difference. psychology of denial" and the "aesthetics of romantic absolutism," to which standards appeal, is linked to the "psychology of painful involvement in each situation." 90 Kelman contends that rules appeal to the stereotypically individualistic/masculine person while standards appeal to the stereotypically altruistic/feminine person. He intertwines the aesthetic and psychological dimensions, asserting, for example, that "the rule form may always tend to appeal to the substantive individualist because its formal virtues match up aesthetically with the virtues he is inclined to admire." 91 Kelman uses psychology not simply to rationalize individual taste but also to circumscribe groups of individuals who will respond in an aesthetically similar manner.92 Noninstrumental viewpoint. Several writers contrast the aesthetic point of view with the empirical, rational and instrumental. For example, Drucilla Cornell describes as "aesthetic" a commitment to reconstructing ethical group life made "without the promise or security of a rational guarantee,"9 3 a commitment "that cannot be proven." 94 Louis Schwartz seeks to inject into a definition of justice a notion of beauty "that transcends utility or expediency."9 5 Mark Kelman approaches the Coase Theorem in a manner "intended to be as 'aesthetic' as it is 'empirical.' "9 6 These writers share the view that an aesthetic approach differs in kind from standard result-oriented modes of inquiry and measurement.
Expression of human potential Viewing the Coase Theorem as a story, Mark Kelman reacts aesthetically by asking "what human potentials are unfolded and revealed, which ones are suppressed?" 97 Other scholars also present the aesthetic response as forward-focused and concerned with future reality: "a mixture of 'is' and 'ought. ' quality of our play, deeply affects our lives: our imaginings are not only a part of our present, but a way of determining the limits of our future." 99 In a similar vein, Drucilla Cornell links aesthetic commitment to the reconstruction of our social world and "not only the capacity for judgment but also the ability to dream of what-is-notyet."IOO These categories of meaning are not mutually exclusive and the terms "aesthetic" and "aesthetics" are richly textured. Some of the meanings invoked by legal scholars echo philosophical approaches examined in the preceding section. Two are particularly important: the aesthetic viewpoint as noninstrumental and different in kind from rational or empirical approaches and aesthetic value as resting on transcendent universal qualities. In the next Part, these meanings, augmented by philosophical notions, form the focus of my analysis of the role of aesthetic considerations in proced~al reform.
III. AEsTHETICS AND PROCEDURAL REFORM
My definition of "aesthetic" here incorporates many of the views of the scholars discussed above. A number of their approaches to aesthetics, however, have been excluded from my analysis. I suspect, for example, that subjective characteristics -among them, taste and personal psychological-sociological profile -may predispose individuals toward certain types of procedures. Io I Yet, philosophy teaches us that claims of taste and individual predisposition, while not necessarily invalid, present serious problems for the aesthetician. I 02 For purposes of my analysis, not only are such claims difficult or impossible to prove but, even if proved, they may simply describe the human condition rather than provide any insights into a more specific link between aesthetics and procedural reform. Accordingly, I ignore these factors in my analysis.
Philosophy suggests that other aspects of my argument have more secure moorings in aesthetics. I contend that procedural reformers sometimes perceive procedure in a noninstrumental manner, as pure form rather than applied formula, and that reformers judge procedures partly on the basis of transcendent formal qualities. sonal concerns is central to aesthetics as a philosophical discipline; 103 legal scholars have also recognized a distinct aesthetic viewpoint and have contrasted it with instrumental modes of perception. 104 Similarly, philosophers and legal scholars have acknowledged the existence of universal qualities on which aesthetic value is based.1°5 Admittedly, proving a link between aesthetics and procedural reform may be impossible. As Mark Kelman said in a similar context, "as with most aesthetic claims, there is little way to prove the connection other than by laying it out and directly assessing its plausibility. "106 Proceduralists rarely, if ever, make explicit references to aesthetics, nor has aesthetics ever been openly recognized as part of the process of procedural reform. 107 Mindful of these limitations, I focus on identifying aesthetic orientations of procedural reformers who advocated procedural codes and those who promoted uniform rules of federal procedure; I then consider briefly the role aesthetics plays in the work of modem reformers, particularly those who seek reforms drawn from comparative procedure.
A. Code and Federal Rules Reformers 10s
Simplicity and flexibility were the watchwords of the reformers re- based their criticism on the "unscientific" nature of the writ system, but in reality they were expressing their desire for an ideal form of procedural system); Gordon, supra note 13, at 443 (codification justified as democratic reform, but it was also used to consolidate the power of the elite and to render the law more aesthetically pleasing); T. KUHN, supra note 7, at 155 (in science, aesthetic reasons for rejecting an old paradigm are "rarely made entirely explicit"). Rules reformers is necessarily different; in essence, I seek to illuminate a small corner of the territory explored by Professors Resnik, Subrin, and Bone. For purposes of this article, I consider portions of the written and spoken works of four reformers in an attempt to discover clues to their aesthetic attitudes and values. My aim is therefore not a historical, political, or ideological overview but instead a microcosmic, perhaps somewhat eccentric view of one among many motivating forces behind procedural change.
[
the product of several decades of procedural evolution and debate, much of it focusing on the issue of how simple, symmetrical and flexible procedure should be. By 1934, it was clear which direction would be taken at the federal level: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, signing legislation that gave the Supreme Court power to promulgate procedural rules for the federal courts, commented: "For the complicated procedure of the past, we now propose to substitute a simplified, flexible, scientific, correlated system of procedural rules prescribed by the Supreme Court." 11° Complexity and technicality were evils to be avoided 111 and both were linked to the common law. As a result, reformers used equity as a guide to shape the new Federal Rules. 112 Several procedural reformers were particularly influential in the process leading up to the 1938 Rules, prominent among them David Dudley Field, Roscoe Pound, Thomas Wall Shelton, and Charles E. 113. Both the choice of focusing on these particular reformers and the descriptions herein of their personalities and predilections are inspired by, and often drawn directly from, Stephen Subrin's excellent article on the history of Federal Rules reform. See Subrin, supra note 17. I am grateful to Professor Subrin for the rich materials he has uncovered concerning these reformers and the period during which they worked. Whenever possible, I have relied directly on primary sources. In this section, those sources are quite often ones to which Professor Subrin's work has led me. My debt to him is thus greater than any footnote or footnotes may reflect.
114. Gordon, supra note 13, at 435. s science-based view of the universe led to his preference for a pleading system grounded on "facts constituting a cause of action.").
[Vol. 89:352 justice" by curbing judicial discretion and caprice. 124 Field stated, "The law is our oruy sovereign. We have enthroned it." 125 For Field, procedure could advance law as a scientific enterprise by providing a framework for ascertaining "facts" and thus objective reality. The Field Code required that a complaint contain "facts constituting the cause of action" 126 and used the term "cause of action" to describe those fact groupings that would trigger judicial intervention. 127 Field wanted procedure to be orderly and simple, but also definite and impervious to change through exercise of judicial discretion. In this latter respect, ·he ·differed significantly from the reformers who followed. 128
For Roscoe Pound, procedure was "the mere etiquette of justice. "129 Nevertheless, he viewed procedural form as important, commenting that "form is, if I may say so, the substance of adjective law."130 Like Field, Pound wa8 drawn to science and was trained as a botanist. 131 His ideal procedural system called for a more scientific approach: procedure should be "systematic and scientific" so as to promote "precision, uniformity and certainty in the judicial application of substantive law." 132 Despite his emphasis on certainty, Pound favored a flexible procedural system that granted judges liberal discretion in fashioning procedures for their courtrooms. Charles Clark emphasized the secondary role of procedure: "pr~ cedural rules are but means to an end, means to the enforcement of substantive justice."13 8 He saw procedure as "the hand-maid and not the mistress of justice'' 13 9 and believed that "rules of pleading or practice should at all times be but an aid to an end and not an end in themselves." 140 In college, Clark excelled in mathematics. 141 Unlike Field, however, whose mathematical interest led him to focus on ascertaining facts through procedural rules, Clark adopted a then-modem view grounded in legal realism: facts cannot be determined scientifically and a procedural system that rests on distinctions between law, facts and evidence is seriously :tlawed. 142 Clark's desire to strip away procedural technicalities and fomial obstructions reflected his modernism. He described the pared-down pleading provisions of the Federal Rules as "the best there is in pleading today" 143 notwithstanding his awareness that more case-specific. pleading rules were sometimes warranted.144 · · For each of these reformers, procedure possessed a disembodied quality. Field thought procedure should facilitate the enforcement of substantive law, 145 a carefully crafted set of rules both simple and orderly, part of his "scientific" construct. For Pound, Shelton, and Clark, procedure was thoroughly divorced from substance: procedure constituted mere rules of etiquette, an unclogged artery through which substantive rights could flow, a means to an end. 146 These varied visions were at once instrumental and noninstrumental; instrumental because procedure had a function to perform but noninstrumental 147 because significance was attached to procedural form. Field thought a procedural code should have "[u]nity of design and uniformity of expression."148 For Pound, form was "the substance of adjective law"l49 and materialized as a clear viaduct in Shelton's writing. 15° Clark, a thoroughgoing pragmatist concerning the role of procedure, still insisted that procedural rules be modem, elastic, sleekI51 even when pragmatism dictated the need for more detail and complexity.1s 2 Science was invoked by Code and Federal Rules reformers alike. Field believed in the "science of the law,'' 153 Pound desired a "systematic and scientific" procedure, 154 Shelton underscored the scientific basis of the new judicial procedure, 155 and Clark sought to advance the science of pleading by freeing pleading from technical requirements.1 56 Legal science and scientific efficiency held a powerful attraction during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 157 Common law techni-145. Professor Bone points out that late nineteenth-century code reformers tended to view legal right and legal remedy as fundamentally dichotomous. Procedure was seen as instrumental to the proper enforcement of substantive law: "a decision about procedure ought to be made by reference to what was necessary to enable the court to craft the remedy that best fit the natural structure of rights involved in a dispute." Bone, supra note 16, at 8. See generally id. at 945.
146. Twentieth-century procedural reformers rejected the rights-remedy dichotomy of the late nineteenth-century jurists. They tended to adopt a pragmatic view according to which procedure was the vehicle for finding the facts of a concrete dispute and identifying substantive norms applicable to it. See Bone, supra note 16, at ~0-98.
Of course, simply because an attitude is noninstrumental does not mean it is aesthetic.
See, e.g., R. CoVER calities were considered "unscientific"; science provided a model for achieving certainty and adaptability in the law.1 5 s Science also played an aesthetic role: it represented efficiency and modernity, embodying many of the qualities which contributed to the reformers' aesthetic vision of procedure. Clarity, precision, simplicity, and symmetry were each values that science seemed to possess. In fact, during the time of the early Federal Rules reform efforts, the scientific world itself had been transformed by the relativity theory of Albert Einstein, a scientist who considered aesthetics important.1 5 9
Even though they did not agree about all aspects of a procedural ideal, to the extent that the Code and Federal Rules reformers appreciated certain stylistic qualities in procedure, their attitudes were aesthetic. This does not mean that their perceptions were limited to, or by, aesthetic sensibilities; it does suggest that aesthetic considerations exerted an influence on reforms. The philosophy of aesthetics describes how an object can be perceived in a number of ways. Beardsley, for example, notes that one may judge an apple for its practical, economic value but also may savor its surface qualities of color, texture and taste. 160 These two forms of perception are not mutually exclusive. In more abstract realms, the same principle holds true: one may appreciate a mathematical formula for its neatness, elegance, or economy without detracting from its usefulness.
The moment of detachment from the practical and instrumental characterizes the aesthetic attitude. Each procedural reformer above seems to have had such a moment, when concern over pragmatic outcomes gave way to appreciation of something more abstract, a system whose very shape -simple or elastic or certain or symmetricalcould be admired. Admittedly, this claim is virtually impossible to substantiate; yet, the feeling that aesthetics played an important role in the process emerges from the reformer's remarks taken as a whole. One senses that a reformer begins by seeking simplicity for pragmatic reasons but that at times the search for simplicity takes on a life of its own, overriding practical concerns. In these instances, the rhetoric of instrumentalism masks an unconscious striving toward an aesthetically pleasing procedural form. Some procedural features suggest a hidden, perhaps subliminal, aesthetic agenda. The Field Code, for example, required joinder of necessary parties, defined as those persons whose "rights" might suffer "prejudice" as a result of "a complete determination of the controversy" between the parties before the court. 161 But this "prejudice" was not due to res judicata or estoppel:
[N]onparties were no more bound by the decree in code procedure than they had been in equity. Nor was the code primarily concerned about the decree's creating actual harm to the absent person or practical impediments to her ability to vindicate her rights in a separate proceeding. Rights were "prejudiced" when a court analyzed and determined them, even though its determination had no binding effect on the absent [party].162
Why then require joinder of such parties? One commentator explains the requirement as part of the Code reformers' focus on remedy: courts should be able to grant at least a minimally adequate remedy without determining the rights of a nonparty. 163 An aesthetic perspective suggests that the code reformers also required joinder because it preserved a more desirable procedural shape. A party was free to choose a remedy or remedies and thus to shape party structure. 164 Once this choice was made, however, the Code insisted that the resulting structure retain an acceptable level of aesthetic unity. Joinder of necessary parties can be explained as a mechanism for eliminating clutter and ensuring completeness.
Hints of aesthetic motivation also exist in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although mostly through omission. For example, the Rules contain no mechanism for separating cases according to differing procedural needs despite Clark's own recognition of the desirability of such a sorting mechanism. 165 omission: "Such an integration of procedure and substance ... would have required a degree of technicality, categorization, and definition that was at odds with the simplicity and uniformity themes the proponents had developed to propel their reform." 166 An aesthetic perspective would add that a mechanism for separating simple and complex cases would have spoiled the unified shape of the Rules and disturbed their aesthetic "focus." 167 This aesthetic concern might well have preceded, at an unconscious level, a reformist platform based on uniformity and simplicity.16s . Similarly, the Rules do not contain different pleading requirements for different kinds of cases, although the reformers were aware of differences among cases that would have made it pragmatically desirable to fashion case-sensitive pleading rules. 169 The rejection of case-specific pleading seems based, at least in part, on a commitment to an aesthetically simple pleading system, coherent and complete, streamlined and uncluttered. Perhaps unconsciously, the Rules reformers, despite their instrumental, pragmatic agenda, took an aesthetic attitude toward procedure and advanced simplicity ofform 170 even when pragmatism might have suggested a more complicated or more detailed path. 171 166. Subrin, supra note 17, at 995-96. 167. See infra text accompanying notes 207-12; see also Resnik, supra note 108, at 508-12 (demonstrating that the private damage action was the principal paradigm case underlying the Rules and that the drafters discounted differences among kinds of cases).
168. In the same way, aesthetic concerns, quite apart from political, social, or other motivators, may constitute part of an explanation of "trans-substantive" procedural rules. See Cover, supra note 17, at 732-33. 169. See Subrin, supra note 17, at 977. The refusal to countenance a procedural system with a variegated pleading mechanism is based largely on a reformist commitment to uniformity and simplicity, Clark himself acknowledged the reformer's strategic inability to compr9mise, stating that "reformers must follow their dream and leave compromise to others; else they will soon find that they have nothing to compromise. Unfortunately, it is difficult to sort out the reformers' aesthetic value judgments in a completely clearcut way. Reformers did not label or identify certain value judgments as aesthetic. As Kuhn points out in the scientific context, aesthetic arguments are "rarely made explicit" -a new theory is simply "said to be 'neater,' 'more suitable,' or 'simpler' than the old." 172 In addition, value statements can have multiple meanings. One can, for example, value procedural simplicity not only because it renders enforcement of substantive law more efficient but also because it pleases one's aesthetic sensibilities. Even the reformers themselves likely would have been unable to unravel and identify each of the coexisting reasons underlying their value judgments. I therefore propose simply to demonstrate how the values articulated by the reformers match aesthetic categories. 173
Field and his associates balked at the needless technicalities spawned by common law procedure and sought a procedural system that would facilitate the simple and inexpensive application of law. Thus, pleading was to be "in ordinary and concise language, without repetition. possible procedure, free of technicality and detail. 177 Pound, for example, decried "the lavish granting of new trials" 178 and "too much detail of procedure" in appellate practice, making it "too elaborate. "179 His ideal "modern practice act" contained only "the general principles of practice" -details were left to rules of court. 180 In fact, in Pound's view, "as between arbitrary action of the law in nearly all cases, because of the complexity of procedure, and arbitrary action of the judge in some cases, the latter would be preferable."1s1
Shelton also abhorred procedural complexity. His campaign for the Enabling Act had as its ultimate goal "a simple, correlated, scientific system of rules of procedure and practice, in lieu of the present complicated so-called 'federal practice.' " 182 Shelton admired the straightforward, streamlined practices of business and commerce and thought legal procedure should emulate them. 1 s3
Clark, too, valued simplicity. This is particularly striking in his approach to pleading. Clark criticized common law pleading as "a curious mixture of the simple and the complex" and believed that the best Code reform preserved "the good points of the older pleading ... in the simple and uncomplicated form of allegation and defense." 184 In Clark's view, "the simple provisions for stating the case in the com- [Vol. 89:352 plaint ... represent about the best there is in pleading today." 185 He favored joining all matters in a single action not only because it would save time and money for court and litigants, but also because it would simplify and reduce court litigation records. 1 8 6 The latter goal seems at once instrumental -fewer, simpler records may enhance efficiency -and noninstrumental -even if more detailed or voluminous records are sometimes helpful, streamlining reduces clutter. Joinder was, in aesthetic terms, neater, simpler, and more elegant.
Seeking simplicity in procedure invokes aesthetic unity. Unity is the most universally recognized criterion for analyzing aesthetic form in works of art. When an art object is unified, it is "simple" in the sense that it is of one piece and contains nothing superfluous.181 In science, too, the search for simplicity is an appeal to the aesthetic value of unity: nowhere is this more apparent than in Einstein's drive to generalize, and thereby to unify, apparently divergent fields of physics. 188
Recall that unity has two components: completeness (an object's needing nothing outside itself) and coherence (how the parts of an object fit together). 189 Coherence in turn may be based on at least three principles: focus (the dominant pattern or compositional scheme), balance or equilibrium (the connection between parts of a whole), and harmony (similarities among parts of a design). A close examination of the reformers' quest for simplicity demonstrates that completeness and coherence were central to the reformers' vision of a simple, unified procedural system.
Completeness is an attractive feature of procedure because, in the words of one reformer, "it represents the difference between a single and permanent surgical operation as compared to chronic physicking."190 For Fie~d, a desire for procedural completeness was part of a vision of a procedural code accompanied by a coordinated substantive code. 191 For the Federal Rules reformers, the same desire led to an essentially self-completing Code -general and elastic principles allowed the judiciary to fill in any missing details. 192 The drive for com-pleteness led Dean Wigmore to complain that the drafters of the Federal Rules had failed to place all existing federal practice rules into a single compilation, observing that "[t]his Code will fail in an important purpose if it does not seek to be complete in itself." 193 Wigmore's complaint seems motivated at least as much by an aesthetic concern for the shape the Rules would take as by a desire for efficiency.
The reformers also valued completeness in another sense: they sought a system that would provide a complete mechanism for resolving disputes. Having decided that law and equity should be merged, both Field and the Rules reformers were drawn to equity practices which permitted complete resolution of a controversy without regard to substantive law, the number of parties, or the nature and number of issues. The Field Code abandoned the technicalities of the writ system and allowed parties to plead simply and in ordinary language. Parties could amend their pleadings and were permitted to join multiple parties, causes of action, and defenses in a single suit, thus maximizing the chance of complete resolution of a controversy. 194 The Federal Rules reformers carried the completeness ideal even further. Opportunities for joinder of parties and claims were increased, 195 Pomeroy advocated the expansion of equitable "multiplicity-of-suits" jurisdiction, which allowed consolidated treatment of numerous, otherwise separate, legal actions. See Bone, supra note 16, at 29-39. Pomeroy justified the use of equity jurisdicpon in certain types of cases "not only because of the availability of injunctive or other equitable forms of relief, but also, and more importantly, because of the power of equity courts to consolidate all the separate law actions and render a decree ideally suited to the dispute as a whole." Id. at 34 (citation omitted). In his analysis of Pomeroy's work, Professor Bone provides powerful evidence that Pomeroy viewed equity procedure aesthetically, in that he was interested more in form than in practical consequences. Pomeroy also sought the aesthetic qualities of elegance and simplicity in an ideal procedural system. With respect to Pomeroy's justification of equity jurisdiction, Professor Bone notes:
Although Pomeroy focused on remedy, he did not take a pragmatic approach to evaluating remedial quality. He assessed the quality of the remedy by reference to its formal structure, not its practical consequences .••• In other words, equity jurisdiction was desirable whenever joining together all the separate law pieces made it possible to reduce the union of partial legal remedies to a more elegant and simpler unitacy form, one that perfectly fit the ideal legal structure of the whole dispute.
Id. (citations omitted).
195. See, e.g., F'Eo. R. Civ. P. 18, 19, 23 (dealing with joinder of claims, joinder of parties, and class actions, respectively). Clark extolled the virtues of the new rules:
The rules providing for the abrogation of technical forms, ·and for free amendment, the simple provisions for stating the case in the complaint, the abolition of demurrers and pleas, the explicit provisions as to the answer, with provisions for the filing of as many defenses in the alternative or regardless of consistency as the defendant has -all these and the other accompanying rules represent about the best there is in pleading today.
Clark, The Challenge, supra note 138, at 456.
pleadings was liberalized, 196 and broad discovery was made central to a new notice pleading system. 197 These reforms were pragmatic, to be sure, but they were also aesthetic, making procedure neater, more streamlined, and more elegant. The reformers sought unity in a procedural system not only through completeness but also through coherence. Pound's view that "form is ... the substance of adjective law" 198 may be ascribed to each of the reformers under scrutiny, for each visualized a set of procedural rules that had a certain shape and design.
A reformer's concept of the focus, pattern or compositional structure of a set of procedural rules can reflect a desire for coherence. The dominant compositional scheme or focus of the Field Code may well be its attention to detail and definition, l99 a structure reflecting Field's view that procedural rules should be tailored to fashion remedies to protect substantive rights. 200 He visualized and constructed a set of rules based on careful definitions: for Field, overly flexible rules were no rules at all. 201 Field could not abide expansive, general code provisions for a number of reasons, among them an aversion to disorder and confusion. 202 His aesthetic sense of what a properly formulated procedural system should look like resulted in a code that was simple and elegant, not in some minimalist sense, but due to its circumscribed, constrained quality. "Unity of design and uniformity of expression" were important to Field, 203 and both are reflected in the structure of his code.
Field also pursued balance and harmony -other aspects of coherence -when he sought to harmonize procedural forms through the merger of law and equity. Separate courts for law and equity, each with its own procedures, seemed wasteful, disorderly, and confus- ing. 204 A single set of procedural rules could bring order and predictability to the enforcement of substantive rights. 205 The procedural choices that Field and the other reformers made in drafting a single code for the merged system reflect a desire to balance legal and equitable procedures. Equity practice influenced the Field Code's pleading provisions, which eliminated the common law's search for a single issue, and its expansion of a litigant's ability to add parties and issues to a single suit. 206
The Federal Rules reformers also valued coherence. They envisioned a lean and general procedure: Pound favored a "systematic and scientific" procedure based on general principles, 20 1 Shelton wrote of the need to simplify procedure, 208 and Clark praised simple and uncomplicated procedural forms, particularly in pleading. 209 Edgar Tolman, secretary of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee for which Clark served as Reporter, captured the prevailing sentiment when he advised that an ideal set of procedural rules should avoid "the faults of our rigid, modem statutes, the best of which contain hundreds of sections, and the worst of which contain thousands of sections dealing with hundreds of thousands of details." 210 Instead, Tolman urged, drafters of procedural rules should "[e]liminate every requirement except the irreducible minimum absolutely necessary to point out the plain and straight path from the institution of a suit to the final judgment."211 Along the same lines, Dean Wigmore criticized a preliminary draft of the Federal Rules for failing to separate lengthy paragraphs and number them.212
The Rules reformers sought coherence as well in a single procedure for cases formerly relegated to either law or equity. Like Field, Pound complained about "the obsolete Chinese wall between law and equity." 213 Clark also took up the banner for merger, stating that "as soon as you get away from the history of the struggle between the Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice in England, I see no possible justification for a division between law and equity." 214 In fashioning the merged system's procedure, the drafters of the Rules did not seek to combine and harmonize elements of both law and equity procedure, as Field had done in his code. ·Rather, the Rules reformers favored equity as a harmonizing mechanism. The Federal Equity Rules of 1912 were seen as "the substantial model for the new Federal procedure of the future."21s The equity rules were admired, in a somewhat detached manner suggestive of aesthetic appreciation, as the embodiment of "the best of modem reform procedure."216
The pervasive attraction of simplicity for the Code and Federal Rules reformers resulted in procedural systems that emphasized, in varying ways, completeness and coherence. Simpler was always better; the reasons why were often not articulated. 217 Of course, the reformers did not always mean the same thing by "simple." Field, for example, sought to simplify procedure through his code and yet, several decades later, Clark criticized the Field Code for lacking the flexibility he thought a simple procedural system should possess. 218 Simplification was not a code word for a designated set of reforms but a more general aesthetic goal. Simplicity came to be desirable for its own sake.
· B. Modem Reformers
Just as the Federal Rules reformers, bent on simplifying procedure, criticized earlier simplification efforts such as the Field Code, 21 9 so today some critics find modem procedure too complicated and seek 213. Pound, supra note 117, at 287. 214. Clark, Fundamental Changes, supra note 138, at 560. 215. Clark & Moore, supra note 121, at 435. 216. Id. at 394. Clark and Moore further noted that, by extending the scope and applicability of the equity rules, "the necessary major element" of their reform effort would be "secured." Id.
217. Aesthetics is only one reason among many for the attraction of simplicity. The code and Federal Rules reformers believed that simple rules were desirable because they were efficient and scientific. See supra text accompanying notes 122-41. In addition, rules deemed "simple"
because of their open-ended and general nature confer power on the coterie of experts who draft them. Such rules need interpretation and it is the drafters, both as consultants and as future members of the bench, who are likely to be called upon to provide such interpretation. See supra note 13; Subrin, supra note 17, at 968-69.
218. Many others also place simplification at the center of their reform agendas. In the section that follows, I consider a number of reformers whose platforms rest, at least in part, on comparisons with the procedural systems of other countries. The reformers do not necessarily share a common goal or ideology. For example, Warren Burger measures current procedures against the standards set in 1906 by Roscoe Pound. Derek Bok, on the other hand, takes a broader view, assessing the role of law in an increasingly complicated America. John Langbein and Albert Alschuler, both admirers of German procedure, draw somewhat different conclusions about how that procedure should influence our own. What unites these reformers, and the reason I have singled them out, is their attraction to simplicity and simplification: for them, it seems, simpler procedures are at once more effective and more aesthetically pleasing. 223. Of course, not all the Pound conferees sought, or even mentioned, simplification. In fact, a few participants seemed, if not suspicious, at least cautious about oversimplifying trial procedure in an attempt to make it more orderly. Judge Leon Higginbotham, for example, warned that "order is not an absolute" and that reforms which threaten to diminish human rights, even if promoting greater procedural efficiency, should be scrutinized critically. See Hig- [Vol. 89:352 example, urged reform "in the direction of simplification of the law" not only as a way of easing the burden on the courts but also as a mechanism for rendering the law more certain and ptedictable. 224 Others criticized the courts for not taking sufficient steps to simplify procedures. 225 Much attention was devoted to alternate streamlined methods for processing and resolving disputes, from the institution of simpler, more "mechanical" rules which would allow clerks or other nonjudicial personnel to resolve disputes, 226 to adopting the British practice of handling corporate takeover disputes, 227 to the use of ombudsmen and arbitration. 22 s Prominent among the participants at the 1976 Pound Conference was then-Chief Justice Warren Burger, an outspoken critic of modem trial practice who has encouraged a variety of reforms aimed at increasing procedural efficiency. In an address to the conference, he praised the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as "a major step toward a pervasive simplification of procedure" and allowed that "major advances" had been made since Roscoe Pound's time to simplify both trial and appellate procedure. 229 Nevertheless, Justice Burger lamented the misuse and overuse of pretrial procedures, and called for reform in this area. He also urged consideration of new, simpler concepts for the resolution of minor disputes and noted with approval the Japanese tradition of informal, private dispute processing as an alternative to litigation in some cases. 230 Pointing out that Japan has fewer lawyers per capita than the United States, Burger attributed the relative absence of formal litigation in Japan to its history of resolving disputes informally "without lawyers, judges and the attendant expense and delays." 231 Another Overseers, 232 Bok was preoccupied with the complexity of American life, particularly when it involves matters legal. He commented on the "complexity" oflitigation, 233 the "elaborateness" of American laws, 234 and the "complexity" and intricacy of American procedures. 235 Bok's reform agenda centers on simplifying rules and procedures in tandem with greater access for the poor and middle class to the legal system. 236 Like Justice Burger, Bok is intrigued by comparisons with Japan: the United States has 35,000 lawyers graduating per year compared with under 15,000 total for Japan, he notes, while Japan graduates thirty percent more engineers than the United States. 237
The attraction of both Burger and Bok to Japanese procedure is puzzling when one considers the reality of Japan's legal culture. In Japan, there are, in fact, many fewer lawyers per members of the population at large than in the United States, but this is a function of deliberate governmental design rather than the result of a simpler, more pristine society. Although approximately 30,000 law graduates take the Japanese equivalent of the bar exam each year, less than 500, or about two percent, of all applicants pass. 238 The truth is that the per capita number of those who take the bar exam is higher in Japan than in the United States, 239 suggesting a picture quite different from Bok's implied image of a population drawn by virtue of superior sensibilities to the more productive field of engineering.
The nonlitigiousness of the Japanese is also largely a myth. The governmentally imposed lawyer shortage, crowded dockets, notoriously slow case progress, and procedural hurdles to effective Iawsuits240 all make litigation in Japan a daunting enterprise. This does [Vol. 89:352 not mean that the Japanese by nature shun litigation nor that American-style lawsuits do not provide an attractive alternative to Japanese dispute resolution in many cases. 241 In fact, in cases where foreign, rather than Japanese, courts are an available forum, Japanese plaintiffs have demonstrated a greater than usual willingness to sue. 24 2 The question, then, is why Burger and Bok insist on a mythical version of a Japan where life is simpler and saner and legal procedures less complicated. The answer rests in part on instrumental bases: the system may be more effective, for example, in resolving minor disputes. But another part of the answer may lie in reformist zeal. The aesthetic goal of simplicity, of elegance in the design of a procedural system, is an attractive foundation on which to build a reform program. Such an aesthetic vision, even if a myth, is preferable to the task of sorting out the reality of another living, breathing, complex human society. Like earlier procedural reformers who often used simplification to justify their reform agenda, 243 these modem reformers rely on the lure of simplicity to enhance the changes they propose.
The German Model
Professor John Langbein looks to West Germany as a model for reforming American civil and criminal procedure. Time and again, Langbein has contrasted the simplicity, elegance, and efficiency of German procedure with the complexity, cumbersomeness, and inefficiency of procedure in the United States. 244 > In criminal cases, Langbein identifies the complexity of full-scale jury trial as the reason for pervasive plea bargaining in the United States; German trial proce-Procedural Reform 391 dure, by contrast, "has been kept uncomplicated and rapid" 2 4 5 so that every case of imprisonable crime can be tried, making plea bargaining unnecessary. 246 In civil cases, Langbein characterizes American procedure as expensive, protracted and unpredictable and contrasts the "tone" of German and American civil proceedings:
Countless novels, movies, plays, and broadcast serials attest to the dramatic potential of the Anglo-American trial. The contest between opposing counsel; the potential for surprise witnesses who cannot be rebutted in time; the tricks of adversary examination and cross-examination; the concentration of proof-taking and verdict into a single, continuous proceeding; the unpredictability of juries and the mysterious opacity of their conclusory verdicts -these attributes of the Anglo-American trial make for good theatre. German civil proceedings have the tone not of the theatre, but of a routine business meeting -serious rather than tense. When the court inquires and directs, it sets no stage for advocates to perform. The forensic skills of counsel can wrest no material advantage, and the appearance of a surprise witness would simply lead to the scheduling of a further hearing. In a system that cannot distinguish between dress rehearsal and opening night, there is scant occasion for stage fright. 247 Langbein finds the separation of pretrial and trial proceedings in American procedure particularly irksome, since it requires that parties conduct discovery for the entire case; 248 it also compels witnesses to tell their stories at least twice and allows for adversary distortions of the stories witnesses tell. 24 9 He proffers the German system as a preferable alternative because it is simpler, neater and more streamlined: the judge alone "digs for facts" and controls their presentation over a series of hearings rather than in a single, continuous trial. 250 Albert Alschuler also draws on West German procedure to fashion procedural reforms, but not in the same way as Langbein Langbein 's use of this theatrical metaphor is interesting from an aesthetic point of view, not because it draws its metaphorical material from the arts, but because it suggests a more detached view of procedure and its impact. The appreciation of procedural "tone" is at least one step removed from a practical instrumental approach to procedure. However, Langbein continues in a much more practical vein as he elaborates on his thesis. searching for a way out of the intricate web of American procedure and seeking refuge in an almost abstract version of a simpler, more efficient German system -a system with "the tone not of the theatre, but of a routine business meeting." 260 No wonder that the aesthetically pleasing features of the German system -order, control, and neatness -are paramount in Langbein's work: he has a reform function to fulfill and admission of the complexity and disorder that attend human enterprise might be taken as weakness.
CONCLUSION
Like their forebears, modem reformers do not treat simplicity as an exclusively aesthetic goal, nor do they mean the same thing by "simple." 261 Yet the pervasiveness of references to simplicity, and the at least occasional discrepancy between modem procedural visions and reality, suggest that these reformers sometimes tend toward simplicity and simplification because they find it more aesthetically pleasing; in turn, this feeling of "rightness" inspires them to adhere tenaciously to their reform proposals. 262 To say that any of the reformers has taken an aesthetic attitude toward procedure is admittedly speculative; their articulated goals are pragmatic and their statements carefully constructed. The attitudinal hints that one can find in the writings and speeches of, for example, the Federal Rules reformers are generally absent here. 263 It is remarkable, however, how often simplicity appears as a common thread linking otherwise unrelated reform agendas: that simpler is better is taken, more or less, as an item of faith. The power of this idea is demonstrated in a recent article, in which a writer who develops a set of rather complex jurisdictional principles to guide the choice of process in a given dispute feels compelled to justify his reform as "simple": "[T]he complexity of the ap- [Vol. 89:352 proach here," he argues, "derives from its simplicity." 264 The lure of simplicity, in the guise of simplification, is understandable. Where central concerns are overcrowded dockets, delays, and inefficiency, it is tempting to seek solutions which shed details and neaten up procedural pathways, which sweep clean and eliminate clutter. To be sure, simplicity may lead to more rational procedures, but not inevitably. Simplicity is much more likely to lead to aesthetically pleasing procedural rules. Unlike a work of art, however, procedure is not meant to be placed on a shelf and admired. And, unlike science, procedure Qike law in general) does not describe or manipulate the inherently orderly natural universe that inspired Einstein. Instead, procedure attempts to shape a complex and disorderly world of human interactions. It should not be entirely surprising that procedures made simple through minimal structure and definition may be unable, by themselves, to bring order to the transactions they govern.
The very simplicity that gives a procedure its aesthetic value in the abstract can contribute to its downfall in concrete application. Discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, was part of the Federal Rules reformers' larger simplification efforts. "Wide open" discovery, it was argued, could help eliminate procedural gamesmanship and put to rout the "sporting theory of justice" denounced by Roscoe Pound. 265 Simpler was better: the discovery rules are largely open textured and general, meant to provide just enough structure to allow an enlightened bench and bar to fill in gaps as needed. Today, however, discovery abuse, whether or not of the dimensions sometimes claimed,2 66 is notorious and the source of many of the complicated procedural tangles which vex modem jurists. Perhaps a less simple, more detailed rules scheme -setting limits, specifying discovery orders, imposing nondiscretionary sanctions -would be preferable. Simplicity cannot always be relied upon to get the job done. 267 Of course, reforms undertaken in the name of simplicity sometimes succeed. The "notice pleading'' system of the Federal Rules was, in fact, simpler than its common law and code predecessors and that simplicity produced some beneficial effects. Not only did a generalized, nontechnical pleading system save the time and money previously spent distinguishing among facts, ultimate facts, evidence, and law,2 68 it also allowed for new legal theories to be formulated without the constraints of preexisting legal categories. 269 Ironically, however, the absence of constraints and categories in the pleading rules -their simple, streamlined shape2 70 -has ultimately made practice under them surprisingly complex. Local rules, 271 standing orders, referral to masters and magistrates, 272 and judicial discretion to impose sanctions for abuse of the rules 273 have all become part of the pleading package. 274 Reformers may need a vision to propel them forward, to buoy them up when support for their reforms is not immediately forthcoming. Aesthetic goals can fill such a need. The history of scientific, political and social reforms proves that proposition. 275 In addition, formal sense, did not have simplicity of implementation as a stated goal; it was anticipated that judges would need to use their discretion and tailor different sanctions to meet the needs of different cases. Id. at 1936-37, 1943.
Rule 11 illustrates one respect in which simplicity plays a different role in procedural reform than it does in science. Simple scientific rules and formulas exist against an elaborate definitional background where basic units of measurement -the cell, the atom and so forth -are commonly understood and form the basis of future developments. The simplicity of Einstein's theory of relativity derives from its ability to unite the complex strands of prior scientific thought into a single, harmonious construct. In procedure, however, the units of measurement have not always remained constant. Many basic concepts -claims, causes of action, facts, notice, sanctionshave been left deliberately general in the interest of simplicity and have shifted in meaning and importance over time. Procedural reforms thus cannot be expected to reflect an order that does not exist nor to organize and harmonize a universe of parts that are themselves not clearly defined. [Vol. 89:352 aesthetic goals are worthy ones, capturing the best of human aspirations and potential. 276 Where procedural reform is concerned, however, becoming preoccupied by aesthetic sensibilities may cause one to be tricked into thinking that the shape of a rule alters the shape of the human transaction it is meant to control or facilitate, rather than vice versa. An aesthetic perception of or attitude toward procedure can make it an end in itself, divorced from the substantive world in which the effects of procedure are realized. An early critic of the Enabling Act described this phenomenon in a salient metaphor: "If a group of mariners tired of studying their complicated charts should decide to throw them away and adopt more simple maps, they would not thereby do away with the air and water currents through which they must pass, or the icebergs or the reefs in their course."277
While aesthetic sensibilities and goals need not be absent from the process of procedural reform -indeed, they have been at least partly responsible for important procedural advances -they need to be appropriately contained. Experience teaches that simpler is not always better. Complexity will not vanish in the face of simple rules; it will just go elsewhere, necessitating steps that may be at odds with the original streamlined system. 21s Recognizing both that aesthetic factors are present in procedural reform and that their role must be limited is a useful first step in ensuring that aesthetic goals do not blind reformers to the social, political, and institutional effects of the changes they propose. 279 Simplicity is not bad. In law, as in science and other fields, the rhetoric of simplicity has propelled, and may continue to propel, positive change. But its limitations must be recognized and other visions pursued. In particular, the reality of the universe within which procedure operates deserves attention. Based on what we know and can discover, 280 there 
